

MODEL AERONAUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA RISK ASSESSMENT BEFORE & AFTER CONTROL MEASURES.

(Use as many sheets as needed)

Risk No 1: Public Safety	LIKELYHOOD	CONSEQUENCE	REESULTANT
KISK NO 1. PUBLIC Salety	<u>(L)</u>	(C)	(R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 1: Model hits a vehicle on the Monaro highway, or crashes onto the road.			
The Consequence: 1. Damage or crash of manned aircraft 2. Vehicle Accident 3. Loss of RPAS/Model aircraft components	2	3	5
 Existing Controls/measures: Promotion and enforcement of club flying procedures, requiring all fixed wing flying to be west of the centerline of the runway. Ensure all transmitters used comply with MAAA approved lists. Ensure club safety rules are understood and observed. Ensure Failsafe's are correctly programmed. All members generally undertake surveillance during flying days. 	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Additional separation standards greater than the regulatory minimum applied through the design of the field.			

Risk No 2: Public Safety	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 2: Model hits visitors on the CMAC lease	<u> </u>	122	<u> </u>
The Consequence: 1. Injury to persons 2. Damage to property	2	4	6
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Safety barriers erected and fences to keep visitors away from pits and runup areas. 2. Safety Signage advising visitors of safety rules. 3. Ensure club members are aware of their responsibility's with respect to visitors and the proper control of their access to higher risk areas	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Additional separation standards greater than the regulatory minimum applied through the design of the field.	1	3 (with additional separation standards)	4

Risk No 3: Public Safety	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 3: Workers transiting on public grasslands	<u>, </u>	1-1	<u> </u>
The Consequence: 1. Injury to persons 2. Damage to property (vehicles)	1	4	5
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Members to not operate in areas where workers are present. 2. Members encouraged to remain vigilant	LIKELYHOOD (L) 0 (Workers are rarely there	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Workers generally carry out activities on weekdays, and not during high activity times. 2. Workers know to alert members to their presence prior to entering area	during flying activities, and alert members to their presence)		

Risk No 4: Public Safety	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 4: Visitor injured on CMAC lease in a non-model related accident	<u>, LE</u> /	<u>(O)</u>	(II) (E+O=II)
The Consequence: 1. Injury to persons 2. Damage to property (vehicles)	3	3	6
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Car parking areas to be clearly marked with suitable barriers and access control 2. Styles to have hand rails and non-slip steps 3. Young children to be accompanied at all times 4. Dogs not permitted on the site 5. Elimination of protruding edges on buildings	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Fencing to keep visitors in visitor areas	1	3	4

Risk No 5: Member Safety	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 5: Member injured by own model while starting/handling prior to flight	<u>157</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>((, (, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>
The Consequence: 1. Injury to Members 2. Damage to property	3	4	7
 Existing Controls/measures: Models required to be positively restrained (MAAA MOP) either by mechanical device or another member while starting Encourage use of electric starters or "chicken finger" devices If carrying model from puts to flight line ensure both hands free to hold model (help with TX) All members generally undertake surveillance during flying days. Safety officer appointed Ensure first aid kit available at site 	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Taxiways installed from runup areas to the runway strip. Markings show where models must shut down engines 2. Documented procedures			

Risk No 6: Member Safetv	LIKELYHOOD	CONSEQUENCE	REESULTANT
Risk No 6: Member Safety	<u>(L)</u>	<u>(C)</u>	(R) (L+C=R)

Hazard 6: Member injured by own model during flying operations			
The Consequence: 1. Injury to Members 2. Damage to property	4	4	8
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Enforcement of documented flying procedures, including:	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
 a. No standing on the strip while flying b. No hovering models within 9 meters from self or any other pilot c. No fast, low passes closer than the centerline of the runway (9m) d. Emphasis of safe circuit and landing training for new pilots 	1	3 (protection by	4
Additional Control Measures: 1. Model proof (crouch) barriers installed between pilots and runway (about 1.4m tall) 2. Low passes are called within the flight box		barrier)	

Risk No 7: Member Safety	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 7:			
Member injured by another model during in the pits area			

The Consequence: 1. Injury to Members 2. Damage to property	2	4	8
Existing Controls/measures: 1. As for Hazard 2, 2. Maintain linear pits area with staring boxes outside of pits separated by fence 3. Ensure 30m rule is enforced, ensuring greater separation between pilots and flight line 4. Ensure good line of sight from pits area to flightline to aid in situational awareness.	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C) 3 (protection by	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures: 1. Model proof barriers installed between the runway and pits area.		barrier)	

Risk No 8: Member Safety	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 8: Member injured by another model in the airside area			
The Consequence: 1. Injury to Members 2. Damage to property	2	3	5

Existing Controls/measures:	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (<u>L)</u>	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
 As for Hazard 2, Strip access permitted only after all pilots are aware of intentions and acknowledge. Strip access limited to model retrieval when other models are operating. 	1	3	4
Additional Control Measures: 1. CMAC culture dictates that models are operated away from the area when a person is retrieving a model.			

Risk No 9: Security of Tenure of Flying Field	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (<u>L)</u>	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 9:			
Loss of permission to develop due to environmental concerns			
The Consequence: 1. Loss of flying field location	3	3	6
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Include environmental consideration's in all DAs 2. Demonstrate respect for the environment in dealing with authorities. 3. Include environmental considerations in RA	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures:	0	3	3

Risk No 10: Security of Tenure of Flying Field	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 10:			
Loss of tenure due to environmental concerns			
The Consequence: 1. Loss of flying field location	3	3	6
Existing Controls/measures:	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
 As for Hazard 1, and Provide fire extinguishers for gas turbine operations Ensure operations are completed in accordance with MAAA MOPS. 	1	3	4
Additional Control Measures: 1. Due to ACT government restrictions, all operations are banned on Total fire ban days			

Risk No 11: Security of Tenure of Flying Field	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 11:			
Loss of tenure due to operations outside of approved regulations			

The Consequence: 1. Loss of flying field location 2. Non compliance with regulation	3	2	5
Existing Controls/measures: 1. Comply with MAAA MOPs	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
 Only MAAA members permitted to fly at this location under the MAAA relevant MOP's, unless approved otherwise. Ensure operations are completed in accordance with MAAA MOPS. All operations shall be conducted in accordance with: a) CASR 1998 Part 101 Subparts A, B, C and G; b) CASA Advisory Circular AC 101-03v1.1 and Direction 96/17 c) The MAAA Manual of Procedures. 	2	2	4
Additional Control Measures: 1. Relationship maintained with Canberra Tower manager Binh Huynh. 2. Club has been in exitance for over 50 years, and is well known in the area.			

Risk No 12: Manned Aircraft Operations in Proximity to YSCB	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u>	CONSEQUENCE	REESULTANT
	(L)	(C)	(R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 12: Model aircraft collides with full size aircraft as a direct result of the CMAC proximity to Canberra Airport			

The Co 1. 2. 3. 4.	Donsequence: Loss of all RPAS/Model aircraft elements Potential for significant damage to manned aircraft in the area Delays to manned aircraft operations Non compliance with regulation	2	5 (RPAS) (4) (Airspace)	7 (6)
Existin	ng Controls/measures:	LIKELYHOOD	CONSEQUENCE	REESULTANT
3. 4. 5. 6. 7.	CMAC to recommend CASA generates a NOTAM or makes mention of CMAC in ERSA. A thorough lookout by pilots and members of the airspace shall be maintained prior to members flying (documented procedure) Local CMAC rules are advertised prominently on noticeboards for all members and visitors 400ft limitation placed on clear signage within the pits area No flying is permitted East of the Centreline of the runway (documented procedure) Only MAAA members permitted to fly at this location under the MAAA relevant MOP's, unless approved otherwise. Ensure operations are completed in accordance with MAAA MOPS. All operations shall be conducted in accordance with: d) CASR 1998 Part 101 Subparts A, B, C and G; e) CASA Advisory Circular AC 101-03v1.1 and Direction 96/17 f) The MAAA Manual of Procedures. g) All operations will be conducted within the confines of the CASA approval.	<u>(L)</u> 1	(<u>C</u>) 4	(R) (L+C=R) 5 ALARP
Addition	onal Control Measures:			
1. 2. 3.	Relationship maintained with Canberra Tower Manager Binh Huynh. (02 6268 5858) Club has been in exitance for over 50 years, and is well known in the area. Club annotated on Canberra VTC			
4.	Model aircraft pilots who hear and/or see a manned aircraft in the area are required to descend or land when manned aircraft are nearby (documented procedure)			

Risk No 13: Manned Aircraft Operations in Proximity to YSCB	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 13:	***		
Model aircraft flyaway/loss of control, and; 1. Travels towards Canberra Airport or Southcare base 2. Exceeds 400ft			

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The Consequence: 1. Loss of all RPAS/Model aircraft elements 2. Potential for significant damage to manned aircraft in the area 3. Delays to manned aircraft operations	3	4 (Airspace) (4) (Equitable use of airspace)	7 (7)
Existing Controls/measures:	LIKELYHOOD	CONSEQUENCE	REESULTANT
1. As per <u>Hazard 1</u> and;	(L)	(C)	(R) (L+C=R)
Members and visitors made aware of how to deal with flyaway scenarios (documented)	\=	\=	(* ') (= - ' ')
procedure)	2	4	6
 a. Members must contact Canberra tower for any flyaway deemed to impact the safety of manned aircraft in the area (towards the airport), or, b. Any model aircraft whose position can no longer be determined. This will ensure Canberra Tower can separate/delay/maneuver any manned aircraft away 3. Canberra Tower phone number prominently displayed on all notice boards within the club. 4. Senior members to ensure new members are fully aware of their obligations in relation to manned aircraft operations 5. Members to ensure models are not operated outside of prescribed areas. 6. Pilots to follow flyaway aircraft (where safe and possible) to ensure unrelated persons can be alerted to the situation. 7. Failsafe to be set appropriate to the model type. Additional Control Measures: 1. As per Hazard 1. 2. CMAC members culture is such that they support each other when threatening situation arise. 		(4) (Equitable use of (airspace)	(6) ALARP

Risk No 14: Self Guided Model Aircraft Operations (SGMA)	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 14:			
SGMA Operations create increased risk of operations.			

The Consequence: 1. SGMA increased risk of operations 2. SGMA mode awareness 3. SGMA workload management	2	4	6
SGMA at CMAC have documented/proven reliability statistics greater than that of model aircraft when operated in accordance with manufacturers (software developers) policy and procedures.		(5) (Airspace)	(7)
 As per Risk 4 SGMA aircraft are operated with a manual takeover, without the need to select any switches (simply fly the aircraft on the transmitter to takeover). By CASA definition they are not SGMA Pilots read and follow documented safety procedures for SGMA equipment Pilots enable and test relevant failsafe features in their SGMA firmware 	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
 Pilots follow pre-flight test procedures to ensure correct hardware operation Pilots check for firmware updates that may impact on safe operation "Maiden" flights are completed done with only one model aircraft in the air and with more than one pilot Pilots aware of procedures for contacting ATC in case of flyaway Redundancy of systems incorporated in to all systems "Heavy" SGMA remain subject to MAAA heavy model inspections and certification 	1	4 (5) (Equitable use of (airspace)	5 (6) ALARP
Additional Control Measures 1. SGMA are operated in accordance with MAAA MOP066 2. Pilots enable R/C failsafe auto-land capability within the confines of CMAC lease.			

Risk No 15: Night Operations	<u>LIKELYHOOD</u> (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Hazard 15:			
Operations at night, decreasing standard safety measured.			

The Consequence: 1. Increased risk of aircraft disorientation 2. Increased risk of member injury from tripping (etc)	2	4	6
Manned aircraft risks have been considered, however are captured by Risk 4; a) The CMAC area of operations is below the MORA/LSALT/MSA for manned aircraft b) Manned aircraft must comply with instrument approach procedures or visual approach criteria by night a. CMAC does not impact these areas			
Existing Controls/measures: 1. As per Risk 4 2. Compliance with MAAA MOP 18 including; a. Adequate lighting on the aircraft 3. Clubhouse lights are to be left on at all times	LIKELYHOOD (L)	CONSEQUENCE (C)	REESULTANT (R) (L+C=R)
Additional Control Measures 1. Torches can be carried by pilots			

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX - LEVEL OF RISK

Table 1 - Consequence Values

	Consequence							
	0	1	2	3	4	5		
People	No injury	Minor injury that does not require medical treatment	Minor injury that requires first aid treatment	Serious injury causing hospitalisation or multiple medical treatment cases	Permanent injury or disability (including blinding) that may result in hospitalisation of at least one person	One or more deaths, multiple severe injuries or permanent total disability		
RPAS	Any element of the RPAS is degraded but task unaffected	A failure not serious enough to cause RPAS damage but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair or incomplete task	Minor RPAS damage resulting in damage to components, incomplete task and future unserviceability of RPAS	Significant RPAS damage but repairable	Complete loss of or destruction of a RPAS component (RPA, camera transmitter, sensor, etc.)	Loss of all RPAS elements		
Reputation	Small delay, internal inconvenience only	May threaten an element of the service resulting in the task or objective being delayed	Risk does not violate any law and can be easily remedied. It has some effect on reputation and/or external stakeholders	Risk does not violate any law and can be easily remedied. It has some residual effect on reputation and/or external stakeholders and while reputation is damaged it is recoverable	Risk violates a law but can be remedied. It has a residual effect on reputation and/or external stakeholders and may result in damage to reputation	Risk violates a law and is unable to be remedied. It has a significant impact on reputation and/or external stakeholders and will result in loss of reputation		
Cost/Property Damage	Negligible	Less than \$1,000	More than \$1,000 less than \$10,000	More than \$10,000 less than \$100,000	More than \$100,000 less than \$1,000,000	Loss or damage exceeding \$M1		
Airspace	No aviation airspace safety implication	Minor breach of aviation safety regulations or RPA Area Approval	Serious issues of compliance with aviation safety regulations, RPA Area Approval or operations resulting in potential avoiding action by a manned aircraft but no collision	Serious issue of compliance with aviation safety regulations or operations or the loss of separation resulting in the potential for a collision with a manned aircraft but the manned aircraft is able to land with no serious injuries or fatalities	Potential for aviation safety incident/s involving multiple life threatening injuries, or fatalities, to less than 10 people	Potential for multiple fatal aviation safety incidents causing multiple fatalities, to 10 or more people		
Equitable access of airspace	No effect on access to airspace users	Some users of the airspace may perceive or experience airspace inequality resulting in between 5 to 10 minute delay or minor detour	Some users of the airspace may perceive or experience airspace inequality resulting in more than 10 minute delay or major detours	Most users of the airspace will experience airspace inequality resulting in long delay (>30 minutes) or major detours	All users of the airspace will experience airspace inequality resulting in long delay (>30 minutes) or major detours	Airspace users are prohibited from operating in the airspace causing significant disruptions to operations and financial cost		

Table 2 - Likelihood

Likelihood	Almost Certain	5	>1 in 10	Is expected to occur in most circumstances			
keli	Likely	4	1 in 10 – 100	Will probably occur			
	Possible	3	1 in 100 – 1000	Might occur at some time in the future			
	Unlikely	10000		Could occur but considered unlikely of doubtful May occur in exceptional circumstances			
	Rare						
	Extremely 0 < 1 in 100000 Rare		< 1 in 100000	Could only occur under specific conditions and extraordinary circumstances			

Table 3 – Risk Rating

			Consequence								
			0	1	2	3	4	5			
Likelihood	Almost Certain	5	5	6	7	8	9	10			
	Likely	4	4	5	6	7					
	Possible	3	3	4	5	6	7				
	Unlikely	2	2	3	4	5	6	7			
	Rare	1	1	2	3	4	5	6			
	Extremely Rare	0	0	1	2	3	4	5			
	Untreated Risk Scores										
	8,9,10 (Extreme risk) - Task is not permitted. Risk controls are required to ensure residual risk is acceptable.										
	6,7 (High risk) - Task is not permitted. Risk controls are required to ensure residual risk is acceptable.										
	4,5 (Medium risk) - Task may proceed, however, risk must be reduced to 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP).										
	1,2,3 (Low risk) - Task may proceed.										